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ECONOMIC LAWS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: WHAT CAN HAINAN LEARN FROM 
OTHER COUNTRIES' EXPERIENCES? CPart I) 
by Pr o fessors Ann and Robert B. Seidman(l) 
Hainan Provinc e seeks t0 inc 1reasE• productivity and raise 
living standards by int ·ri:•d u c i ng new economic laws to attract 
foreign investment. Primier Li Peng has warned that opening the 
wind•:•w may let in flies a nd mosquitos. Drawi ng on experience i n 
other developing countries, ""'h at kinds o·f flies and mosquitoes 
may ·fly in, and what kinds of economic laws might help to keep 
them out without s huttin£1 the window to desired foreign 
investments? 
Developing country government s the world around compete to 
attract fi:o·reign capi t al. Th ey .:.:i ll 1,Jant the same benefits: 
capital, advanced technoli:igies, managerial expertise , and access 
to overseas market s to ti:. buy new 
machines. Transnational corporations are in business, however, 
not to he 1 p poo·r countries attain development, but 
their c;1loba1 profit s . i. n intense international 
competitio~, developing country governments too i:•f ten not only 
1. Ro bert B. Seidman, Professor of law at Boston University, 
USA, and Fulbright Professor the Peking Univ ersity Law 
Depar tment, served as a legal consultant to the Zimbabwe 
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· USA, and a Professo r in the Peking University Economic s 
Department, chaired the Ecoromics Departments of the Universities 
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United Nations Transnational CorpoYate Center. Both professors 
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open their windows to attract foreign firms, but take down their 
screens. As a result, four kinds of unwelcom~ mosquitoes and 
flies swarm in. 
First , t o maximize their profits, foreign firms often take 
advantage of the host countries' funds and resources while 
contributing little to development. For example, governments 
often assume for eign investors bring new capital. Frequently, 
however, they invest a minimum amount of their own funds, and 
borrow much more from lo ca l banks, or sell shares to local 
government s , institutions , or individuals so that they operate 
primarily on locally-generated capital. 
Again, governments expect foreign firms to introduce new 
technologies and skills. But they often bring technology in 
packages they design and control from their foreign headquarters. 
They pay local workers l ow wages to assemble parts or hook wires 
to terminals. Th Gy never teach them to unpack the technology or 
to ~epair and ultimately make the parts themselves. 
Host governments hope foreign firms will build a pole of 
growth, stimu lating new productive activities, providing jobs and 
raising incomes throughout an entire region. I n many countries, 
instead, foreign projects opera t e in enclaves, using imported 
machinery and equipment, s upervised by foreign engineers. They 
do nothing to stimulate regional deve l opment. An oil well in 
Nigeria provides the extreme case: Once capped, it s imply pumps 
oil into tank s a~d thence to waiting ships . Around it, village 
life continues as it always has . 
Second, attract ing fbreign firms may impose excessive cost s 
I 
on hos t counries. For example, multinational giants using 
sophistic a ted ne w technologies may oust local ent~rprises fr om a 
profitab le field, causing unemployment and wasting l oca l 
resources. In Zambi a , a new foreign factory using imported 
machines and materials squeezed out many smal l shoe makers who 
used locally made l ea th er . A ca reful e va lua tion may reveal that 
the benefits of a fcrei gn investment do no really offset the 
consequences of red uced use of loc a l resources, increased 
u nemployment and lowered real incomes . 
Foreign firms typically demand the right t o use foreign 
currency without government int e rference. Experience elsewhere 
s ugges t s they tend to use the host countries' scarce foreign 
exchange earnings to import and sel l profitable items l ik e air 
conditioners a nd electronic toys for the superrich, or to se nd 
profits back to their headquarters abroad, rather than to import 
mac hinery, equipment and spare parts to improve industrial and 
agricu ltur a l productivity. In Kenya, private trading f ir ms 
spent a fifth of the nation's foreign exchange earnings t o import 
Mercedes Benz cars wealthy individuals, instead o f 
fertilizers and pesticides to raise peasan t output. 
Foreign firm s not infr~quentl y use trans fer pricing to evade 
lo cal currency contro l s . In Zimbabwe, th e loc a l affiliate of a 
foreign mining fi rm p8 id above-world-market pri ces to purchase 
machinery from its overseas pa rent, while selling its mineral s 
·ex ports to it at be l ow- wo r ld - prices. In this way, the local 
mining affia liate manipulated prices to trans fer its locally-
earned profits in foreid~-cur ~e ncy to it s for e ign parent without 
I 
paying local taxes. 
Resea1r ch reveals:. that, e>·;emp t ions ·f O\r 
foreign investments consti tut e an unwarranted cost to the host 
country. First, they only look cost-free, as tho1.tc.;;1h the hos t 
co:•untry me·rel y ~~o methinc.;;1 In ·r ea 1 it y, it l.. c--~ 
as if the government collected the tax, and gave the co:•mpany an 
equal cash subsidy. Second , si nce their firms only benefit from 
tax exemptions after their inves tments ea1rn in C•:•me, cor po:•r ate 
managers seldom view them an incentive when making an 
investment. As one t?>-: pl ained, "When we invest, we worry about 
lo:1sing money, not ~.,1ha t we'll havo to pay if we make it. Income 
tax credits come like after dinnE"r." In fact, most 
indust·r ial countri12s permit national companies to s ubtr a ct the 
pay to:• for ei gn governments from the ta:.-;·es they pay 
their home government. Thus developing country tax exemptions do 
not reduce the foreign firms' overall tax burden. 
Thirdly, f li es and mosquitoes may bring in diseases in the 
form of corruption, dependency and crE"~ation of a new comprador 
capitalist class . ·fort:? i gn ·f inn' s succes~; in a develo:•ping 
country depends on local allies -- businessmen , intellectuals and 
other elites as wel 1 c:\S disc·retiona·ry dE·? c isions by public 
officials. Foreign fi(mS have cash and other goodies to win 
f ·r iends and t:nri be officials. Local alli€~s tend to:• 
comprador ruling class the:\t· seldom e:i:ercises power in favour of 
the people. 
firms typica ll y invest in businesses in 
developing countries that. - cc•mp l ement t hei ·r i,Jor 1 d -1vJide co:•mmE?·r c: i al 
interests: the acquisition of raw materials and labor-intensive 
manufactures produced by low paid labor, 
s urplus manufactures, and increased profits. As evidenced by the 
cu ·r ·rent debt bun·Jen inflicted on most African, Southeast Asian 
and Latin American governments, foreigri firms' investments thus 
tend to tie the host economy to the:~ international capital ist 
economy, with its fluctuations and financial crises. 
In the 1-.~:r; per ien ces of developing countries 
throughout the world suggest the need to devise economic laws to 
attract only thi:•se ·fo ·rl~ign investme:?n ts that will help them 
implement carefully drawn development 
unwanted flie s and mosquitoes. 
plans while screening out 
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LEGAL SCREENS AGAINST FLIES AND MOSQUITOES CPartII) 
Ann Seidman and Robert B. Seidman (1) 
Experience elsewhere in the developing world SU9£lt::!Sts 
several ways of using law to open the window to attract foreign 
capital, while keeping out unwanted flies and mosquitoes. 
First, because geoc;_~raphi c, political, economic aod social 
characteristics of ci::11.mtry di f·fer qualitatively from al 1 
otheYs, can never- simp ly copy the laws of another-
country and expect it to produce the same results. 
copy Hong Kong's laws and expect to become anotheY Hong Kong. 
Hai nan can , of learn from experience elsewhere, 
especially about that not contribute to 
development. Hainan must formulate its own law in light of its 
own obstacles and yesources. Th ose obstacles and resources, of 
course, inevitably differ from those anywhere else in the world. 
Second, to avoid th£~ indiscriminate admission of foreign 
firms that may waste local Yesources while contributing little to 
development, many statutes create a licensing system to admit 
1. Robert B. Seidman~ , F rofessor of Law at Boston 
University, USA, and Fulbright Professor at the Peking University 
Law Department, taught and did research for eleven years in five 
different African co untries , a nd has served as consultant to 
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~ rofessor of International Development and Social Change at Clark 
-University, USA, and presently Fulbright Professor in the Peking 
University Economics De~a~tment, has chaired the Economics 
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only those firms which meet specif ied criteria. 
The fi ·rst conceirns the criteria foy gyanting a 
licence.•. Simply to list in vague terms ( 11 impiroved 
tr=:" ch nol ogy '' 11 incneased E?mp l oyment 0:0 ppo·r tuni ties", 
example), however, leaves too much discretion to the licensing 
o·fficials . Th ey may not l:: now i,.; hat technologies o ·r new jobs would 
contribute to development. 
by no means do all new industries crea te poles 
of region - wide growth, stimul a ting other investments that utilize 
more lo cal provide more jobs , and r.::~ise living 
standards thr0ughout an entiye yegion. To play that rolE?, a 
private firm must employ loc a l Yesources (inc luding 
labor),_ or p·roduce tools, equipment and materials to -increase 
productivity in local industries. A foreign firm that uses suc h 
sophisticated technology th at whenever · a 
must be s hipped by to Tol::yo, Bel'"lin, 
cont ·ributes far less than a plant i..;h:i.ch cc.1n use local machine 
shops to repair its equipment. 
l\lor do al 1 h i~~h -te c hno 1 ogy industries help Third World 
economies. Usually, the host country needs not high technology of 
e.vtrj 
~I sort, but hi9h technolo~~y of ve1r y specific sorts. It needs to 
have the trechnology sufficient ly unpacked so that local workers 
and engineers learn to ser vice ~nd repair the machines, and how 
to design new machines using that technology. Th e criteria in the 
·1icensing law s hould specify the sorts of technology required 
from time to time, and the degree of unpacking trequired. 
that, fo:o ·r foreign firms to:• 
I I 
appropriately meet natio nal the nationa l plan 
should specify the investments needed to adva nce the country's 
deve 1 a:•pment plant of s uch -and-such a 
capacity, the exploitation of a known mineral resource, the 
introduction of a advanced technology. In e·ffect, 
foreign investors then bid for the opport unity to con~:;;truct and 
run those specific enterprises. 
Some statutes require the licensing agency to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis , balancing the known costs of admitting a 
foreign investor against the expected benefits. The a£_1ency can 
ei they fo·,.-bid c:~ too-costly f2nti1rely, admit a 
marginally advantageous one without granting it costly benefits, 
like unlimited use of foreign exchange, income tax concessions, 
or the unlimited export of profits . 
How can a statu t e ensuye that officials take the planned 
o. e. c.w .,..t- 1 Yo. .!J ra."+. v..1 \ ,' ce" s es 2. 
criterii.'I into c::~ •'.\11 b ir-, ii.§ ·, · cq;rhd.Fl~:i:ltif!lel!!:il:1:iscefls~? A ·few statutes 
require them to make their de cisions in writing, specifying the 
factors they considered, and the . weight they gave to eac h. Making 
that opinion public may provide a way to permit public opinion to 
influence decision-makers. Procedures enab ling anybody affected 
to appeal the decision m~ke it more difficult for officials to 
act aYbit·,.-arily. 
How can the law he lp make suye that the foreign fiYm 
fulfill s its promises? Instead of merely licensing a foreign 
fiYm to invest in the host country, some statutes yequire that 
the license include specific conditions the firm must meet, for 
workeYs to repail' 
r 
and manufacture the setting a timetable for 
employing nationals in management position~:;; ·using a sp£~·ci-fied 
increasi ng percentage of locally produced materials and p a rts. 
A third set of problems concerns the rewards that the host 
country pays to induce foreign pirivate investment. Some 
investment codes include establishing tariff barriers to protect 
the foreign investor to the detriment of local consumers; easing 
·foreign pennittin£t the payment of 
unlimited profits out of the country; outright subsidies (usually 
in the form o·f income import duty relief); building 
industrial est,1_ate~; fo ·r the 
other concessions. 
foreign investors; and a myriad of 
How can law help to ensure that the incentives the host 
country provides actua ll y induce new foreign investment, and that 
the amount of investment it induces bears a prudent re l ationship 
to the cost of the inducement to the host government? 
Shortly after independence, for hoping to induce 
new investment, Zimbabwe the prohibition C•n 
foreign firms' remittance of profits to thei1r home countries. 
The following yeart foreign investors sent home over $100. million 
more in foreign exchang~ than they could have under the previous 
la•,J, but they brought into the country only about $25 million in 
new ca pi ta 1. Zimbabwe lost over $75 milli on in foreign exchange 
as well as in loc a lly -generated investable surplus. 
A vaYiety of . legal devices would have enabled Zimbabwe to 
reinvest these funds. To mention only one, the government could 
have linked the finn's abi1ity to s hip out foreign e;i;change to 
its foreign exchange earnings. 
Income tax exen1ptions constitute ~ way governments seeking 
to attract foreign investment frequently lose funds to no 
pu r pose. A government that grants tax relief is really just 
paying the foreign firm a subs idy equal to the tax forgiven. 
This is particularly undesirable since, under its home-country 
ta x law, the foreign firm frequently can deduct taxes it pays to 
the host country from the taxes it pays its home government. 
Finally,a fourth set of problems arise: How can law help to 
keep out the really dangerous mosquitoes and flies: corruption, 
loss of investable surplus, class formation, external dependency? 
Many states have enacted laws generally guarding against 
corruption: creating State Procurators or Ombudsmen, instituting 
meticulous accounting systems and the monitoring of expenditures 
by state banking systems, setting up special task forces of one 
sort or another, and requiring cadres to declare their assets. At 
especially vulnerable points like foreign exchange controls and 
import licensing, the more precisely stated the criteria for 
public officials'actions, the more collegial the procedures Cit 
is more difficult to bribe a group than an individual), the more 
public the decision-making process, the less likely will 
corruption cre~p in. 
Various countries have introduced legal devices to hinder 
emergence of a comprador bourgeosie class benefitting from ties 
with foreign investors. Because of their wealth, this new 
economic ruling class frequently wields dispropoYtionate 
6 
influence in government policy ··- making. othe·r 
countri es have experimented w.i. th Leadership Codes , forbidding 
cadres from owning shares firms, from owning rental 
real esta t e, emp loying worker s . 
Of course, th e ultimate control mu s t 
i s , by popular participa tion in decision-making. Achieving that 
r Gquires policies and laws with a reach much 
control laws . 
Formul at ing techniques to admit desired 
wider than investor 
investments while 
screening out unwanted -e ffects does not exceed the limits of 
law. It requires, that law - makers direct their 
attention, not only to the task o f opening the window, but to th e 
equally important tas k of installing the screens . 
.. 
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